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INTRODUCTION
With respect to both registered and unregistered trademarks, there is a
distinct cultural difference between legal regimes that give primary im-
portance to the policy of preventing consumer deception, and those that
treat this goal as subsumed within the larger goal of regulating competition.
For the most part, the narrower goal of consumer protection predominates in
the common law countries, while civil law countries have embraced the
broader concept of unfair competition.' However, approaches to competi-
tion are more nuanced than this, and such a two-part classification oversim-
plifies the cultural conflict. Within the common law and civil law sectors,
* IGT Professor of Intellectual Property Law, William S. Boyd School of Law,
University of Nevada, Las Vegas. This Article was awarded the 2012 Ladas Memorial
Award in the Professional Category by the International Trademark Association (INTA). An
early version of this paper was presented at the Conference on Law and Multi-Agential Gov-
ernance: The Impact of Law on Market, Competition and/or Innovation, at the Hokkaido
University School of Law, Sapporo, Japan, on Aug. 18-20, 2011. The Author would like to
thank all of the participants in that conference for their generous insights, and most especial-
ly Professors Yoshiyuki Tamura, Branislav Hazucha, Adi Ayal, Antonina Bakardjieva
Engelbrekt, Shuya Hayashi, Ryu Kojima, Matias Leistner, Ryoko Oki, Masabumi Suzuki,
and Noriyuki Yanagawa. The Author also thanks Professor Marketa Trimble for her assis-
tance with German materials, and Professor David Vaver for his observations on English
case law.
1. As used here, the term "unfair competition" refers to the broad civil law doc-
trine, which restricts competitive activities even in the absence of consumer confusion. In the
United States, however, "unfair competition" is typically used as a synonym for passing off.
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there are a variety of approaches, and some common law jurisdictions have
interpreted the common law doctrine of passing off more broadly than oth-
ers, although stopping short of a full-fledged law of unfair competition.
In general, the approach of civil law countries elevates the goal of
fairness above that of competition, and thus it has been criticized as anti-
competitive. The common law approach tends to make competition the pri-
mary goal,2 treating fairness as a consideration only when a competitor's
conduct is particularly extreme. Such extreme conduct may be found, for
example, where the competitor's actions are likely to mislead or confuse
consumers about the origin or nature of the goods on offer.3 While both
approaches consider the interests of both consumers and competitors, under
the common law approach the interests of consumers have generally been
considered to be of primary importance. In contrast, discussions of unfair
competition in the civil law countries tend to focus less on consumers and
more on generalized, and typically ill-defined, notions of "fair and honest"
behavior by market competitors.4 In some instances, broad interpretations of
unfair competition law display such a reverence for trademarks as to imbue
them with something approaching moral rights.
Judge Jacob of the United Kingdom recognized the tension between
the common law tort of passing off and the broader doctrine of unfair com-
petition in Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd. v. Wards Mobility Services Ltd:
Never has the tort shown even a slight tendency to stray beyond cases of deception.
Were it to do so it would enter the field of honest competition, declared unlawful
for some reason other than deceptiveness. Why there should be any such reason I
cannot imagine. It would serve only to stifle competition.
5
The culture clash between passing off and unfair competition has
come to a head most recently in a series of cases involving comparative
advertising, but it can also be seen in the laws pertaining to character and
2. See, e.g., L'Oreal SA v. Bellure NV, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 535, [20], [2010]
R.P.C. 23 (U.K.) (noting that the "healthy attitude [toward] competition law" in the United
States would not prohibit the use of a competitor's trademark in truthful comparative adver-
tising); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964) (holding that state
unfair competition laws may not prohibit competitors from copying an unpatented article but
may take steps to prevent consumers from being misled as to the source of the goods); Smith
v. Chanel, 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968) (courts have generally protected only a "trade-
mark's source identification function for reasons grounded in the public policy favoring a
free, competitive economy"); Societe Comptoir de l'lndustrie Cotonniere Etablissements
Boussac v. Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 399 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1962) (suggesting that
aggressive enforcement by trademark owners reflects anti-competitive motives).
3. See, e.g., William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 532
(1924); U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 681 F.2d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 1982).
4. See infra Part II.
5. Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd. v. Wards Mobility Services Ltd., [1994] 1 W.L.R.
1564 [1570] (U.K.).
Vol. 2011:14131414
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personality merchandising.6 A similar conflict appears to be emerging in the
context of keyword advertising. The divergent approaches to passing off
and unfair competition law illustrated by these examples must be taken into
account by all trademark owners, in the United States and elsewhere, that
hope to engage in cross-border marketing of their goods or services.
While significant differences between the passing off and unfair com-
petition regimes remain, the gap has been narrowing. In a piecemeal fash-
ion, case law in common law countries has broadened the concept of pass-
ing off to apply to an ever-broadening group of activities.7 Within the Euro-
pean Union (EU), the conflict between these doctrines has been highlight-
ed-and their convergence hastened-by decisions of the European Court
of Justice (ECJ), which has interpreted several harmonization directives in a
manner consistent with a broad concept of unfair competition, thus creating
pressure on the United Kingdom to interpret "passing off' in a manner far
removed from its original meaning.8 In common law countries that are not
bound by EU policy, trademark owners have used their influence over law-
makers to steadily broaden the scope of trademark protection (for both reg-
istered and unregistered marks) to avoid the consumer deception require-
ment for traditional passing off claims, leading in some cases to legislative
recognition of dilution9 and cybersquatting ° claims. Even where such spe-
cific legislation does not apply, trademark owners have often succeeded in
persuading courts to give ever-broader scope to the concept of passing off.
If this trend continues, many of the differences between the passing off and
unfair competition regimes may eventually disappear.
I. TRADITIONAL AND EXPANDED CONCEPTS OF PASSING OFF
The concept of passing off lies at the heart of the system of trademark
protection in the common law countries. It is rooted in the common law
action for deceit. Although intent to deceive was originally an element of
the action, it is no longer required, as the focus of the tort has shifted to the
effect on consumers. While the tort has expanded considerably over time,
causing observers to remark on its "protean qualities,"' 1 it still does not ap-
proach the broad concept of unfair competition law as recognized in conti-
6. See infra Sections IlilA, III.B.
7. Hazel Carty, Character Merchandising and the Limits of Passing Off, 13 LEGAL
STUD. 289, 290 (1993) [hereinafter Character Merchandising].
8. See infra Part 11.
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006); see infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
11. Character Merchandising, supra note 7, at 289.
1415
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nental Europe, because it is not a general action for misappropriation of the
intangible value of a mark. 2
The essential elements of a traditional passing off claim (often called
the "classic trinity") are: (1) goodwill-an ill-defined term that refers to the
consumer's desire to purchase goods because of their association with a
mark, (2) misrepresentation as to source, and (3) a likelihood of damage to
goodwill as a result of the misrepresentation. 13 In its classic form, passing
off occurs when a merchant places a competitor's trademark on goods or
services in order to deceive or confuse the rival's customers into purchasing
the mislabeled goods.'4
However, different common law jurisdictions have expanded the tradi-
tional tort of passing off in a variety of ways. While these expanded ver-
sions still fall short of a general law of unfair competition, in some cases
they appear to be influenced by similar principles, such as unjust enrich-
ment or free riding.
In the United Kingdom, the concept of "extended form passing off'
applies to misrepresentations about the qualities or characteristics of
goods.1" It expands the passing off concept beyond protecting the goods of a
particular merchant, instead protecting all merchants who produce a particu-
lar category of goods, if the defendant has made a misleading use of the
word or phrase that identifies the category. 6 Thus, a likelihood of confusion
is still required. 7 However, the goodwill in question is not attached to a
trademark and does not belong to a single trader; it belongs collectively to
all of the traders who offer goods possessing the qualities characteristic of
the category. 8 While only a small number of cases have addressed this form
of passing off, plaintiffs have succeeded in claims arising from the mislead-
ing use of such terms as "advocaat,' 9 "champagne,"2 ° "sherry,"'" "Scotch
12. LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 711, 726-27
(3d ed. 2008).
13. See Vennootschap v. J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd., [1979] A.C. 731 (H.L.) 742
(appeal taken from Eng.); Reckitt & Colman Prods. Ltd. v. Borden, Inc., [1990] R.P.C. 341
(H.L.) 406 (U.K.); BMW Canada, Inc. v. Nissan Canada, Inc., [2007] F.C.J. No. 991, 30
(Can. Ont.).
14. See Vennootschap v. J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd., [1979] A.C. 731 (H.L.) 742
(appeal taken from Eng.); Reckitt & Colman Prods. Ltd. v. Borden, Inc., [1990] R.P.C. 341
(H.L.) 406 (U.K.); BMW Canada, Inc. v. Nissan Canada, Ind., [2007] F.C.J. No. 991, 30
(Can. Ont.).
15. This concept has gained a foothold in Canada as well. See John McKeown,
Vodka, Champagne and Passing Off, CASSELS BROCK & BLACKWELL LLP (Apr. 14, 2010),
http://www.casselsbrock.com/DoclVodka.ChampagneandPassingOff.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. Vennootschap v. J Townsend & Sons, (Hull) Ltd., [1979] A.C. 731 (H.L.) 742
(appeal taken from Eng.).
Vol. 2011:14131416
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whisky, 22 "Harris tweed,"23 and "Swiss chocolate. 24 Recently, a maker of
vodka succeeded in bringing such a claim against the manufacturer of
VODKAT, an alcoholic beverage that did not meet the legal requirements to
be marketed as "vodka" under European law.25 The term VODKAT did not
resemble the trademark used on any particular brand of vodka, and thus
could not be challenged under a traditional passing off theory. 26 Nonethe-
less, it was actionable under the broader theory because it implicitly misrep-
resented the nature of the product.27 The VODKAT case is particularly no-
table because it was the first to hold that extended form passing off is not
limited to prestige or luxury products. 28 Even a generic term such as vodka,
in the court's view, has a reputation sufficient to give rise to goodwill.29 In a
separate opinion, Lord Justice Rix expressed concern that, by applying the
concept of extended form passing off to a generic product such as vodka,
the court had improperly broadened the doctrine, which had previously been
applied only to prestige products (champagne), highly specialized products
(advocaat), or products with specific geographic origins (champagne and
Swiss chocolate).3" In Rix's view, "passing off should not by dint of exten-
sions upon extensions trespass beyond the legitimate area of protection of
goodwill into an illegitimate area of anti-competitiveness."'" Lord Justice
Rix's concerns echo the concerns that have been voiced by other United
Kingdom judges who perceive a cultural shift in the English law of passing
off, away from the traditional focus on protecting marks as source indica-
tors, and toward embracing a general law of unfair competition.32
Extended form passing off is not recognized in the United States. In-
stead, the Lanham Act provision on "false advertising" provides a federal
20. See Bollinger v. Costa Brava Wine Co. Ltd., [1960] R.P.C. 116 (Ch.D.) (U.K.)
(defendant could not call its sparkling wine "Spanish champagne" because it would mislead
consumers into believing that it came from the Champagne region of France).
21. Vine Prods. Ltd. v. Mackenzie & Co. Ltd., [1969] R.P.C. I (High Ct., Ch.D.)
(Eng).
22. John Walker & Sons Ltd. v. Douglas McGibbon & Co. Ltd., (1972) S.L.T. 128
(Scot.).
23. Argyllshire Weavers Ltd. v. A Macaulay (Tweeds) Ltd., (1965) S.L.T. 21
(Scot.).
24. Chocosuisse Union des Fabricants Suisses de Chocolat v. Cadbury Ltd., [1998]
R.P.C. 117, aff'd [1999] R.P.C. 826 (High Ct., Ch.D.) (U.K.).
25. Diageo North America, Inc. v. Intercontinental Brands (IBC) Ltd., [2010]
EWCA (Civ) 920, [2011] R.P.C. 2 (U.K.).
26. See id. 6.
27. Id. 15.
28. Id. 51.
29. Id.
30. See id. 76.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., L'Oreal SA v. Bellure NV, [2008] R.P.C. 9 (C.A.), 77 159-61 (U.K.)
(Jacob, LJ).
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remedy for merchants who are injured by a competitor's false statements
about the nature of either the competitor's goods or the goods of the com-
plaining merchant.33 However, a false advertising claim under the Lanham
Act can succeed only if the competitor's statements are literally false or
likely to deceive or confuse consumers;34 if the claim is not literally false,
the plaintiff must prove that consumers were actually misled.35 Thus, false
advertising does not apply to the sale of sparkling wine from California as
"champagne"--which consumers in the United States perceive as a generic
term-although it would apply if the merchant explicitly claimed, or strong-
ly implied, that the wine was made in France. Similarly, it is unlikely that
the VODKAT mark would be actionable as false advertising, unless evi-
dence showed that the name led a substantial number of consumers to be-
lieve that the product was 100% vodka.
Another branch of passing off-known as "false endorsement"-has
been recognized in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia.
Whereas traditional passing off occurs when the defendant's unauthorized
use of an origin indicator makes consumers likely to believe that the plain-
tiff is the source of the goods or services offered by the defendants, false
endorsement may be found where consumers are likely to believe that the
plaintiff endorses, approves, or is somehow affiliated with the defendant's
goods or services.36 In the United Kingdom, false endorsement has allowed
some celebrities to prevent the unauthorized commercial use of their names
or likenesses3" in spite of the United Kingdom's refusal to recognize a true
right of publicity as is recognized in the United States.38 In the United States
false endorsement claims may be combined with right of publicity claims;
however, they can also be used to prevent unauthorized merchandising ac-
tivities using origin indicators other than names and likenesses-for exam-
ple, unregistered trademarks.39 One problem with the false endorsement
concept is that courts have had difficulty defining the exact nature of the
connection that consumers must perceive between the defendant and the
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(l)(B) (2006).
34. Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 474 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing McNeiI-P.C.C.,
Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Col., 938 F.2d 1544, 1549 (2d Cir.1991)).
35. Clorox Co. P.R. v. Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 36 (1st Cir.
2000); United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1182 (8th Cir. 1998).
36. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1992)
(commercial imitating entertainer falsely implied that he endorsed defendant's goods).
37. See Irvine v. Talksport Ltd., [2002] EWCA (Ch) 36, [2002] F.S.R. 60 (U.K.),
affd [2003] EWCA (Civ) 423, [2003] F.S.R. 35 (U.K.).
38. See, e.g., Elvis Presley Trade Marks, [1999] R.P.C. 567 (U.K.); Lyngstad v.
Anabas Prods. Ltd., [1977] F.S.R. 62 (High Ct., Ch.D) (U.K.).
39. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d
200, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1979).
1418 Vol. 2011:1413
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plaintiff.' In the United Kingdom, for example, Sir Michael Kerr suggested
that it was sufficient if the public perceived the plaintiff as somehow
"mixed up" in the defendant's business.4 In contrast, Lord Justice Millett
has suggested that the public must perceive the plaintiff as responsible for
the quality of the defendant's goods; a perception of financial support was
not enough.42 The Australian courts struggled with the same question, with-
out finding a clear resolution, in Hogan v. Koala Dundee and subsequent
cases.43 It is clear, however, that false endorsement can be found even if the
goods or services are dissimilar." Increasingly, courts rely on the public's
familiarity with merchandising practices to bolster a finding that false en-
dorsement confusion is likely. For example, in 1991 a United Kingdom
court found passing off where a defendant used images of the Teenage Mu-
tant Ninja Turtles on clothing without a license; the court reasoned that a
substantial portion of the public knows that reproducing characters on goods
generally involves a license, thus making it likely that the public would be-
lieve the defendant's goods to be licensed. 5
Passing off has also been extended to misrepresentations regarding the
quality of a plaintiffs goods. For example, a United Kingdom court found
passing off where the defendants sold merchandise that the plaintiff manu-
facturer had discarded as substandard while representing that it was the
plaintiffs new, improved product.46 While the defendants were truthful in
representing the plaintiff as the source of the goods, their representation was
misleading because it failed to disclose that the goods were not of first qual-
ity.47 This application is widely accepted in the United States as well,48
where it is also used to prevent importation of gray market goods.49
40. HAZEL CARTY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC TORTS 194 (2001) [hereinafter
ECONOMIC TORTS].
41. Harrods Ltd. v. Harrodian School, [1996] R.P.C. 697 (Ct. App.) 720-21 (citing
Ewing v. Buttercup Margarine Co., [1917] 34 R.P.C. 232, [237] (U.K.)); ECONOMIC TORTS,
supra note 40, at 194.
42. Harrods Ltd., [1996] R.P.C. 697 [713]; ECONOMIC TORTS, supra note 40, at 194.
43. Hogan v. Koala Dundee Pty Ltd. (1988) 12 IPR 508 (Austl.); see infra notes
148-60 and accompanying text.
44. ECONOMIC TORTS, supra note 40, at 194-95.
45. Mirage Studios v. Counter-Feat Clothing Co. Ltd., [1991] F.S.R. 145, [159]
(U.K.).
46. AG Spalding & Bros v. AW Gamage Ltd. (Taxation), [1914-15] All E.R. 147
(H.L.), [1915] 32 R.P.C. 273; ECONOMIC TORTS, supra note 40, at 191.
47. AG Spalding & Bros v. AW Gamage Ltd (Taxation), [1914-1915] All E.R.Rep.
147 (H.L.).
48. See, e.g., Davidoff & Cie, S.A. v. PLD Int'l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1301-02
(11 th Cir. 2001).
49. See, e.g., Societe des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633,
644 (1st Cir. 1992).
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Another expansion of traditional passing off recognized in several
common law jurisdictions is a concept known as "reverse" (or "inverse" or
"upside down") passing off, which applies when the defendant offers the
plaintiffs goods to the public while falsely identifying them as the defend-
ant's own goods, or where the defendant falsely attributes to its own goods
qualities that are present in the plaintiffs goods, such as by using photo-
graphs or samples of the plaintiff's goods or by quoting testimonials from
customers referring to the plaintiffs goods.50 The United Kingdom courts
have only reluctantly embraced this tort;5 it has been more frequently in-
voked in the United States. 2 In both the United Kingdom and the United
States, however, the most common application does not involve the actual
sale of the plaintiffs goods under the defendant's name; rather, it involves a
type of false advertising that misrepresents the quality of the defendant's
goods.53 This activity does not utilize the plaintiffs goodwill at all, because
it does not mention the plaintiffs trademark or trade name. Arguably, it is
not passing off at all. 4 The concept of reverse passing off seems much clos-
er to an unfair competition claim, because what is being appropriated is not
the plaintiff's goodwill (since the defendant does not even refer to the plain-
tiff as the source of the goods), but rather the plaintiff's creativity and effort
in creating a quality product. This amounts to a claim of misappropriation,55
which common law regimes have generally been reluctant to recognize. On
the other hand, reverse passing off fits within the overall purpose of passing
off law, which is to prevent consumer deception.
II. UNFAIR COMPETITION
Article 10bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property requires signatories to provide protection against unfair competi-
50. ECONOMIC TORTS, supra note 40, at 195-96.
51. ECONOMic TORTS, supra note 40, at 196; see Matthew Gloag & Son Ltd. v.
Welsh Distilleries Ltd., [1998] E.T.M.R. 504, [511], [1998] F.S.R. 718 (High Ct., Ch.D)
(U.K.); John Roberts Powers Sch. v. Tessensohn, [1995] F.S.R. 947; Bristol Conservatories
Ltd. v. Conservatories Custom Built Ltd., [1989] R.P.C. 455 (C.A.) (U.K.).
52. A larger number of courts in the United States have purported to apply it, but on
closer inspection these cases have actually involved false advertising. See Mary LaFrance,
When You Wish Upon Dastar: Creative Provenance and the Lanham Act, 23 CARDOzO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 197, 207-09 (2005).
53. See, e.g., Matthew Gloag & Son Ltd., [1998] E.T.M.R. 504, [506] (Scotch whis-
ky labeled as Welsh whisky); Universal Furn. Intern., Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc.,
618 F.3d 417, 438-39 (4th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff s furniture displayed as samples of defend-
ant's furniture).
54. BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 12, at 755.
55. In the United States, the misappropriation tort has largely been limited to "hot
news," based on the facts of International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215
(1918).
1420 Vol. 2011:1413
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tion, which is defined as "any act of competition contrary to honest practic-
es in industrial or commercial matters."56 The only acts expressly proscribed
by Article l0bis are those that create confusion with the business of a com-
petitor, those that falsely discredit a competitor's business, and those that
mislead the public as to the characteristics of the goods being offered. All
three of these activities involve deception," which is the basis for the doc-
trine of passing off as recognized in common law jurisdictions. Yet most
civil law jurisdictions interpret unfair competition to include many practices
that do not involve deception. According to the ECJ, the requirement of
"honest practices in industrial or commercial matters," as reproduced in
Article 6(1) of the EC Trade Marks Directive," implies "a duty to act fairly
in relation to the legitimate interests of the trade mark owner,"59 language
that leaves much room for interpretation, and that has been criticized as
"circular. '6' The ECJ has identified as "unfair" not only those uses that mis-
leadingly suggest a commercial connection between two parties, but also
those that take "unfair advantage of [the] distinctive character or repute" of
a mark, those that discredit or denigrate a mark, and those that present a
"product as an imitation or replica of the" trademark owner's product.61
The term "free riding" has been used to describe the kinds of non-
deceptive activities that may constitute unfair competition. The World Intel-
lectual Property Organization (WIPO) has defined free riding "as any act
that a competitor or another market participant undertakes with the intention
of directly exploiting another person's industrial or commercial achieve-
ment for his own business purposes without substantially departing from the
original achievement.
62
Civil law jurisdictions have used different mechanisms to develop
their unfair competition doctrines. Some countries have developed their
unfair competition law through judicial interpretation of a general provision
in the civil code (France, Italy, and the Netherlands).63 In other countries,
unfair competition doctrines are based on specific legislation (Austria, Bel-
"56. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. I Obis(l)-(2), July
14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.int/export/
sites/www/treaties/en/ip/paris/pdfltrtdocs-wo020.pdf.
57. See Tom Alkin, Should There Be a Tort of 'Unfair Competition' in English
Law?, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 48, 48 (2008).
58. First Council Directive 89/104, art. 6(1), 1989 O.J. (L 40) 5 (EC).
59. Case C-228/03, Gillette Co. v. L-A Laboratories Ltd. Oy, 2005 E.C.R. 1-2337,
41, 2005 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 41, *25 (Mar. 17, 2005).
60. Alkin, supra note 57, at 49.
61. Gillette, 2005 E.C.R. 1-2337, 43, 45.
62. WIPO, PROTECTION AGAINST UNFAIR COMPETITION 55 (1994) (WIPO Pub. No.
725(E)).
63. ANSELM KAMPERMAN SANDERS, UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 23 & n.52 (1997)
[hereinafter UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW]. In France, the law is Art. 1382 of the Civil Code.
Id. at 24. In Italy, it is Art. 2598 of the 1942 Civil Code. Id. at 49.
1421
HeinOnline  -- 2011 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1421 2011
Michigan State Law Review
gium, Denmark, Finland, German, Japan, Luxembourg, Peru, Korea, Spain,
Sweden, and Switzerland) or specific provisions within broader legislation
(Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Hungary, Mexico, Peru, Ro-
mania, and Venezuela).' 4
In France, unfair competition law derives from a general tort liability
statute, Article 1382 of the French Civil Code.65 Two categories of unfair
competition have been recognized: (1) concurrence deloyale-interference
with competition, and (2) concurrence parasitaire-free riding.66 Concur-
rence deloyale generally requires confusion, but it does not require competi-
tion.67 Concurrence parasitaire does not even require confusion. 8 For exam-
ple, a French court found concurrence parasitaire when a candy company
began marketing its candy bars in 3-packs of 300g bars, the same configura-
tion already in use by the plaintiff, its more established competitor, which
held a forty-two percent market share. 69 Without finding any confusing sim-
ilarity in the brand names or trade dress, the court relied on the principle of
unjust enrichment to hold that the defendant was unfairly "profiting from
the success" of the plaintiff.7°
As the French decision illustrates, deception and confusion are not re-
quired in order to establish a claim of unfair competition in most civil law
regimes.7' Indeed, some civil law jurisdictions treat "slavish imitation" of
product features as actionable unfair competition, regardless of whether
those features are protected by intellectual property laws or whether the
imitation leads to consumer confusion.72 For example, German unfair com-
petition laws have protected fashion designs even though they are not eligi-
ble for protection under more specific intellectual property laws.73 The ap-
plication of unfair competition laws to otherwise-lawful imitations seems to
be based on the notion that the imitator is improperly appropriating (usually
with minimal cost or effort) the benefits of another party's creative invest-
64. Id. at 23 & nn. 54-55.
65. Id. at 24.
66. Id. at 26.
67. UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, supra note 63, at 26-27.
68. 1-9 DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE § 9.04[3] (2010).
69. Societe Mars Alimentaire v. Societe Aegean Trade Co., [1993] E.I.P.R. D-282.
This case is discussed in UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, supra note 63, at 28.
70. Id. at 28 n.75.
71. See Thomas Farkas, Does the UK Need a General Law Against Unfair Competi-
tion? A Fashion Industry Insight: Part 2, 33 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 290 (2011); Andreas
Breitschaft, The Future of the Passing-Off Action in the Law Against Unfair Competition: An
Evaluation from a German Perspective, 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 427 (2010).
72. UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, supra note 63, at 27, 39, 49; CHRISTOPHER HEATH,
THE SYSTEM OF UNFAIR COMPETITION PREVENTION IN JAPAN 120-40 (2001) (comparing ap-
proaches to slavish imitation in Europe and Japan).
73. HEATH, supra note 72, at 122-23.
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ment.74 In Spain, imitation is unlawful if it is "systematic" and designed to
impede a competitor to a degree beyond "the natural market response."75
Not surprisingly, the line between lawful and unlawful imitation has often
been difficult to draw. 6
III. CONFLICT AND CONVERGENCE: THREE CASE STUDIES
Within the EU, the culture clash between the narrower common law
concept of passing off and the broader scheme of regulation under unfair
competition law has led Lord Justice Jacob of the United Kingdom to la-
ment that "European trade mark law is in danger of becoming a forest of
case law where everyone loses their way."77 As discussed below, three areas
of litigation provide useful case studies of the conflicts and convergence
between passing off regimes and unfair competition regimes-(1) copycat
products and comparative advertising, (2) merchandising, and (3) keyword
advertising.
A. Copycat Products and Comparative Advertising
The application of trademark law to "copycat" products and compara-
tive advertising illuminates the divide between the Anglo-American ap-
proach to unfair competition and the approach that predominates in civil law
countries. Passing off regimes tend to encourage relatively unbridled com-
parative advertising, except where it is misleading." They also impose no
restrictions on products that imitate other products, provided that the imita-
tion does not mislead-for example, by imitating a competitor's trade dress
in a way that misleads consumers as to the origin of the goods-and does
not infringe rights protected by copyright and patent laws.79
In the United States, comparative advertising is a highly valued type
of commercial speech.8" The only requirement is that it be truthful-or at
74. Id.
75. Id. at 123 (quoting Unfair Competition Prevention Act 3/1991 § 11, Spain's
unfair competition statute).
76. See generally id. at 128-29, 136-40.
77. 02 Holdings Ltd. v. Hutchison 3G Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1656, [35] (U.K.).
78. See, e.g., Erven Warnink v. J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd., [1979] A.C. 731
(H.L.) 742 (U.K.); Erven Warnink v. Townend, [1979] AC 731, 742 (Diplock, L.) (noting
that even "exaggerated claims" which are "untrue" are permitted as mere "puffing"); HECTOR
MACQUEEN, CHARLOTrE WAELDE, GRAEME LAURIE & ABBE BROWN, CONTEMPORARY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND POLICY 797 (2011).
79. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
80. See Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v. Bleem, 214 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir.
2000); August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995); 16 C.F.R. §
14.15 (2012); Charlotte J. Romano, Comparative Advertising in the United States and
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least not demonstrably false in its assertions of fact." There is a high toler-
ance for "puffery"-vague claims that one product is superior to others,
without any specific factual assertions to support those claims. In truthful
comparative advertising, it is acceptable to identify competitors by their
trademarks. This policy applies regardless of whether the advertising claims
that the products are similar or that one party's product is superior to the
other party's. It is also acceptable to ridicule or disparage a competitor's
products, so long as there is no factual misrepresentation.83 In television ads
aired during Super Bowl broadcasts, rivals Coke and Pepsi, and Miller and
Anheuser-Busch, frequently ridicule their competitors' products (and some-
times their customers);" in a popular and long-running series of television
ads, Apple Computer has stereotyped Microsoft products (and implicitly
their loyal customers) as stodgy, overweight, conventional, and bland."
Copycat products are permissible in the United States as long as they
do not violate intellectual property rights (patents, copyrights, trade dress, or
France, 25 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 371, 377 (2005); Stephen Nye, In Defense of Truthful
Comparative Advertising, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 353 (1977). The federal dilution statute con-
tains an express exemption for comparative advertising. 15 U.S.C. § I 125(c)(3)(A)(i) (2006).
81. See, e.g., Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 941 (3d Cir. 1993); Calvin
Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd., 824 F.2d 665, 668 (8th Cir. 1987).
82. See, e.g., Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's Intern., Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 498-99 (5th
Cir. 2000); Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th Cir. 1997).
83. Sims v. Mack Truck Corp., 488 F. Supp. 592, 605-06 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Universal
Athletic Sales Co. v. Am. Gym, Recreational & Athletic Equip. Corp., Inc., 397 F. Supp.
1063, 1073 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Chandris Am. Lines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 707, 712-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The case of Deere &
Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994), is the exception that arguably proves
the rule. In that case, the Second Circuit found actionable dilution where the defendant's ad
portrayed the plaintiff's leaping male deer trademark in a disparaging way (presenting the
deer as fearful and intimidated by the competitor's product). Id. at 41-42. The court's finding
of liability was based on a dilution theory rather than a passing off or general unfair competi-
tion theory. Id. at 42. The decision has been roundly criticized, and does not represent main-
stream thinking under prevailing dilution theory in the United States. It is probably no longer
good law, after the 2006 Federal Dilution Revision Act added the comparative advertising
and parody/criticism/commentary exemptions of 15 U.S.C. § l125(c)(3)(A)(i)-(ii) (2006).
See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:92
(4th ed. 2012); Paul Alan Levy, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act-A Consumer Per-
spective, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1189, 1198 n.46 (2005).
84. See SUSAN DENTE Ross & PAUL MARTIN LESTER, IMAGES THAT INJURE:
PICTORIAL STEREOTYPES IN THE MEDIA 231 (2011); Miller, Budweiser Wrestle Over Ads,
USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food2005-11-15-
beer-battle x.htm; Associated Press, Battle Between Rival Beermakers Getting Nasty,
MSNBC.COM, Jan. 19, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6844772/ns/business-usbusiness/
t/battle-between-rival-beermakers-getting-nasty/.
85. See Tim Nudd, Apple's 'Get a Mac,' the Complete Campaign, ADWEEK, Apr.
13, 2011, http://www.adweek.com/adfreak/apples-get-mac-complete-campaign- 130552.
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trade secrets).86 Where a vendor offers a non-infringing product that is iden-
tical to the product of a famous brand, it is lawful to advertise it as such and
to identify the famous brand by its trademark.87 Thus, for example, generic
or "house brand" medications that contain the same active ingredient as the
products offered by brand-name competitors may be advertised as such.88
This policy applies equally to "copycat" perfumes.89 Thus, it is lawful to sell
a copycat perfume and to identify, in advertising or any other promotional
materials or labels, the famous perfume that it imitates. The comparative
advertising right is, however, limited by the passing off concept that under-
lies the law of trademark infringement-the famous maker's trademark
must not be used in a way that would confuse consumers about the origin of
the copycat product.9° Thus, if the famous "Chanel No. 5" trademark were
featured too prominently on the label of the copycat perfume bottle, this
could lead some consumers to believe the copycat product and genuine
Chanel No. 5 are offered by the same maker. This would be a classic case of
passing off.
Civil law regimes have historically taken a highly restrictive approach
to comparative advertising, sometimes prohibiting it altogether.9' For exam-
ple, Germany traditionally "took the view that practically all forms of com-
parative advertising, even if true, [are] unfair competition-the notion was
that the newcomer should not 'piggyback' on the established reputation of
another."92 A similar approach long prevailed in Italy.93 In France, truthful
comparative advertising is permitted only if it objectively compares "essen-
tial, pertinent, verifiable, and representative characteristics of' the prod-
ucts;94 a claim of unfair competition will arise if the defendant's advertising,
even if truthful, makes derogatory or personal attacks against the plaintiff.95
86. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
87. Saxlehner v. Wagner, 216 U.S. 375 (1910); Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562,
566 (9th Cir. 1968); Societe Comptoir de l'Industrie Cotonniere Etablissements Boussac v.
Alexander's Dept. Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962).
88. Cf Viavi Co. v. Vivimedia Co., 245 F. 289, 292 (8th Cir. 1917).
89. Chanel, 402 F.2d at 566.
90. McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 511 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.
2007).
91. See 2-31 THE LAW OF ADVERTISING § 31.04 (2011).
92. 02 Holdings Ltd. v. Hutchison 3G Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1656, [41] (U.K.).
93. See Irene Calboli, Recent Developments in the Law of Comparative Advertising
in Italy-Towards an Effective Enforcement of the Principles of Directive 97/55/EC Under
the New Regime?, 33 INT'L R. INDUS. PROP. & COPR. L. 415, 421-23 (2002).
94. CONSUMER CODE ART. L. 121-8 (U.K.).
95. 1-9 DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE § 9.04[4] (2010). Until 1992, the law was even
more restrictive. See Romano, supra note 80, at 379-84.
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The recent trend in the EU, however, has been toward liberalization.96
This trend culminated in the 1997 Comparative Advertising Directive
(CAD), which instructs member states to permit comparative advertising
under specified conditions.97 Several of these conditions are directed toward
the narrow goal of preventing consumer confusion as to the origin or quali-
ties of goods and services and thus are entirely consistent with the approach
of passing off regimes." Others, however, go well beyond this goal and
reflect the values of unfair competition law. Most notably, Article 4 of the
CAD permits comparative advertising provided that:
(c) it objectively compares one or more material, relevant, verifiable and repre-
sentative features of those goods and services, which may include price;
(d) it does not discredit or denigrate the trade marks, trade names, other distin-
guishing marks, goods, services, activities or circumstances of a competitor;
(f) it does not take unfair advantage of the reputation of a trade mark, trade name,
or other distinguishing marks of a competitor or of the designation of origin of
competing products; [and]
(g) it does not present goods or services as imitations or replicas of goods or ser-
vices bearing a protected trade mark or trade name.99
Until recently, the United Kingdom encouraged comparative advertis-
ing as fundamentally pro-competitive.' ° That was before the case of
L 'Oreal SA v. Bellure NV. At issue was the question of whether the makers
of copycat perfumes could name the famous perfumes they imitated on
comparison lists that disclosed to consumers which of the defendants' prod-
ucts corresponded to each of the famous perfumes. The Court of Appeal of
England and Wales referred several questions to the ECJ concerning the
precise relationship between the EC trademarks directive-which grants
broad protection to trademarks against those who would denigrate or take
"unfair advantage" of their reputations-and the CAD.' There was no
question of consumer confusion and, thus, no passing off.'02
96. 2-31 THE LAW OF ADVERTISING § 31.04 (2011).
97. Council Directive 97/55, art. 1, 1997 O.J. (L 290) 18, 20 (EC) (amending Coun-
cil Directive 84/450). The 1997 Directive was replaced in 2006 with Council Directive 2006
O.J. (L 376) 21 (EC) (hereinafter CAD). The comparative advertising restrictions discussed
in the text are retained in the 2006 version.
98. CAD, supra note 97, art. 4(a), (h).
99. Id. at art. 4(c), (d), (f), (g).
100. See British Airways PIc v. Ryanair Ltd, [2001] E.T.M.R. 24, [19], [32]; Barclays
Bank Pic v. RBS Advanta, [1996] R.P.C. 307 (Ch.D.) (U.K.).
101. L'Oreal SA v. Bellure NV, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 968, [164] (U.K.).
102. "Consumers are not stupid. They will not see the cheap copy as being the same
in quality as the original. They will see it for what it is and no more." Id. at [63].
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The ECJ ruled that the prohibition against using a competitor's trade-
mark in comparative advertising was prohibited not only in the case of
counterfeit goods but in the case of "any imitation or replica," that such use
was prohibited even if the advertisement was not misleading or likely to
confuse consumers, and that such use, by its very nature, took "unfair ad-
vantage" of the competitor's trademark.'°3 The court noted that the policy of
EU trademark law was to protect all of the functions of a trademark-not
only its function as an origin indicator and a guarantee of product quality,
but also the functions "of communication, investment or advertising."'"'
This ruling was not well-received in the United Kingdom, where Lord
Justice Jacob declared that the ECJ had placed a "muzzle" on lawful com-
petitive activity, infringing the defendants' rights of free speech and impair-
ing the consumer's right to receive information about competing products.0 5
He also labeled the ECJ's policy anticompetitive. °6 In particular, he sug-
gested "that countries with a healthy attitude to competition law, such as the
US, would not keep a perfectly lawful product off the market by the use of
trade mark law to suppress truthful advertising."'0 7 He accused the ECJ of
failing to define what constitutes "unfair" advantage and allowing its disap-
proval of the defendants' business to influence its decision:
I regret that the ECJ in this case has not addressed the competition aspects of what
it calls "riding on the coattails." The trouble with deprecatory metaphorical expres-
sions such as this ("free-riding" is another), containing as they do clear disapproval
of the defendants' trade as such, is that they do not provide clear rules by which a
trader can know clearly what he can and cannot do.
108
Finally, he questioned the ECJ's assertion that the law should protect
the "communication, investment or advertising" functions of a mark, as
distinct from its function as an origin indicator; Jacob saw no basis in the
legislation for protecting these functions, and found them "vague and ill-
defined."'0 9 He also saw "no rational ... basis" for the ECJ's holding that
lawful imitations should be treated the same as counterfeits under the com-
parative advertising directive."0
The ECJ's ruling was promptly criticized by researchers at the Max
Planck Institute, who noted, with respect to the court's restriction of truthful
commercial speech, that "[w]hereas French courts would probably not have
103. L'Oreal SA v. Bellure NV, C-487/07, 73-75, 79 (June 18, 2009).
104. Id. at 58.
105. L'Oreal SA v. Bellure NV, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 535, [7-15] [2010] R.P.C. 23
(Eng).
106. Id. at 16-19.
107. Id. 20.
108. Id. 17.
109. Id. 29-30.
110. Id. 39.
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blinked at the suggestion, English judges are harder to convince.""' One
Max Planck researcher called for repeal of Article 4(g) of the CAD." 2 As
Lord Justice Jacob pointed out with evident satisfaction, the ECJ's opinion
has been roundly criticized in other quarters as well. "'
B. Merchandising Rights
In the analysis of disputes over unauthorized merchandising, a similar
tension exists between the narrow approach of passing off and the broader
concept of unfair competition. However, the concept of passing off in some
common law jurisdictions has expanded to more closely resemble unfair
competition law.
Generally speaking, the concept of merchandising involves using a
mark on goods not specifically to identify their origin, but to capitalize on
consumers' affection for the mark.'"' Merchandising often involves placing
a popular mark on goods that are different from the goods for which the
mark is famous-for example, placing the Ferrari mark on a T-shirt."5 A
merchandising right may be asserted with respect to a registered mark or a
wide variety of unregistered marks-for example, the titles of films, televi-
sion shows, or videogames; the names or likenesses of athletes, entertainers,
or other celebrities; and the names and likenesses of fictional characters." 6
In some instances, unauthorized merchandising involves the use of copy-
righted images-for example, where the use involves the image of a fiction-
111. Annette Kur, Lionel A.F. Bently & Ansgar Ohly, Sweet Smells and a Sour Taste
- The ECJ's L'Oreal Decision, (Max Planck Inst. for Intell. Prop., Competition & Tax Law
Research Paper No. 09-12, Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 10/01
2009).
112. Annette Kur, Trade Marks: The Future of the Advertising Function, MAX
PLANCK INSTITUTION FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & COMPETITION LAW (Mar. 23, 2011),
available at http://www.ucl.acuk/laws/ibil/docs/l I brands kur.pdf (providing slides from a
March 23, 2011 presentation at the Institute of Brand and Innovation Law at University
College London).
113. See, e.g., Darren Meale & Joel Smith, Enforcing a Trade Mark When Nobody's
Confused: Where the Law Stands after L'Oreal and Intel, 5 J. OF INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAc.
96, 103 (2010); Dev Gangjee & Robert Burrell, Because You're Worth It: L'Oreal and the
Prohibition on Free Riding, 73 MODERN L. REV. 282 (2010).
114. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory
or Fait Accompli? 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 472 (2005).
115. See Irene Calboli, The Case for a Limited Protection of Trademark Merchandis-
ing, 11 U. ILL. L. REv. 865 (2011).
116. See, e.g., id. at 884; Reinhard Schanda, Austria, in CHARACTER MERCHANDISING
IN EUROPE 13 (Heijo Ruijsenaars, ed., 2003); Peter Jaffey & Nick Couchman, English Law,
in CHARACTER MERCHANDISING IN EUROPE, supra, at 355; Lee v. Marvel Enters., 386 F.
Supp. 2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Macintosh, No. 89-8342,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9917 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 1992); Nice Man Merchandising, Inc. v.
Logocroft, Ltd., No. 91-7475, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3569 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 1992).
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al character, such as Mickey Mouse-in which case the complaint would
probably include both copyright and trademark claims. "7 This discussion,
however, focuses solely on trademark claims (registered or unregistered)
that arise from unauthorized merchandising.
Under the approach of the civil law countries in the EU, the unauthor-
ized use of a trademark, a fictional character, or a celebrity's name or like-
ness will often be actionable even if consumers would not believe there was
any endorsement or licensing arrangement, because under the law of unfair
competition this is a type of free-riding on the reputation of the celebrity or
the owner of the mark. In France, even if there is no competitive link be-
tween the parties' goods, unauthorized merchandising is addressed under
the doctrine of "agissements parasitaires.""' In Germany, both registered
and unregistered marks that have prestige value are protected against ac-
tions that exploit their reputation."'9 Unfair competition remedies for unau-
thorized merchandising have been especially strong in Austria. When the
emblem of an English football club was used on merchandise without the
club's consent, the Austrian Supreme Court held the defendant liable for
parasitic exploitation of the club's image and reputation, emphasizing that
the reason the emblem was attractive to consumers was because it signified
the club's achievements, which were the result of the club's efforts and ex-
penditures. 2  The Court has consistently applied the same ef-
fort/expense/achievement rationale in later cases involving noncompeting
goods and services.''
Nonetheless, there are exceptions, even in countries where the civil
law ordinarily provides strong protection for the reputations of well-
established marks. In 2010, Germany's highest court refused to find either a
likelihood of confusion or the taking of "unfair advantage" where a defend-
ant sold remote-controlled scale-model replicas of the Opel Astra that fea-
tured the Opel logo (a registered trademark) affixed to the grille. 22 Even
though Opel had registered this mark both for motor vehicles and toys, the
Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) considered the fact that the replica car market in
117. See, e.g., Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir.
2011).
118. Patrick Martowicz, France, in CHARACTER MERCHANDISING IN EUROPE, supra
note 116, at 121-22. This doctrine is also called "concurrence parasitaire." UNFAIR
COMPETITION LAW, supra note 63, at 28.
119. Christian Schertz & Susanne Bergmann, Germany, in CHARACTER
MERCHANDISING IN EUROPE, supra note 116, at 136-37.
120. Reinhard Schanda, Austria, in CHARACTER MERCHANDISING IN EUROPE, supra
note 116, at 23 (discussing OGH 17.9.1996 - Football Association - OB 1 1997, 83).
121. Id. at 23-24 (collecting cases).
122. Case 48/05, Adam Opel AG v. Autec AG, 2007 E.C.R. 1-01017, 2007 ECJ
EUR-Lex LEXIS 1972 (Jan. 25, 2007) (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Nuremberg Higher
Regional Court] Jan. 14, 2010, Case I ZR 88/08 (Ger.) (the "Opel-Blitz 11" case), available
at http://lexetius.com/2010,1701.
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Germany had existed since the late nineteenth century, and concluded that
German consumers would perceive the presence of the mark simply as one
of the details necessary to making an accurate replica of the Opel Astra. A
European commentator notes, however, that in other civil law jurisdictions
the same facts might lead to a different conclusion, "taking into account
'local' customs and views relating to (toy) cars."'2
In some civil law regimes, unfair competition laws do not encompass
every instance of unauthorized merchandising, because the laws impose a
secondary meaning requirement or require a competitive relationship be-
tween the parties.'24 The International Association for the Protection of In-
dustrial Property (AIPPI) has urged these countries to expand their unfair
competition laws in order to eliminate these restrictions.'25
Under the traditional English law of passing off, a mark is not in-
fringed unless it is used to misrepresent the origin of goods or services.2 6 A
series of cases in the 1970s established that unauthorized merchandising
was not passing off, because the mark appealed to consumers without indi-
cating the origin of the goods; passing off would occur only if consumers
would infer that quality control was being exercised by the party authorized
to license the mark.'27 Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom does
not recognize a right of publicity; thus, English courts generally do not rec-
ognize a cause of action for unauthorized commercial appropriation of a
celebrity's name or likeness, even where the plaintiff disguises the claim as
one of "false endorsement." For example, members of the musical group
Abba could not prevent the use of their images on T-shirts and other prod-
ucts, "'28 and the Spice Girls could not win a passing off claim against a de-
fendant that made stickers featuring their likenesses.'29 However, a well-
known racing car driver had a passing off claim when a radio station used
his likeness in an ad that implied that he endorsed the radio station; the
court used the false endorsement branch of passing off, believing that con-
sumers might actually believe that the driver endorsed the station. 3° And
123. Birgit Clark, Bundesgerichtshof Decides in the Opel/Autec Toy Car Case, 5 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. & PiAc. 212, 213 (2010).
124. CHARACTER MERCHANDISING IN EUROPE, supra note 116, at 8.
125. Id. at 9.
126. See BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 12, at 713-14.
127. Taverner Rutledge Ltd. v. Trexapalm Ltd., [1977] R.P.C. 275 (High Ct., Ch.D.)
(U.K.); Lyngstad v. Anabas Prods. Ltd., [1977] F.S.R. 62 (High Ct., Ch.D) (U.K.); Wombles
Ltd. v. Sombles Skips Ltd., [1977] R.P.C. 99 (High Ct., Ch.D.) (U.K.).
128. Lyngstad, [1977] F.S.R. 62.
129. See Halliwell v. Panini, (Lightman, J.) (June 6, 1997) (Ch.D.) (LEXIS) (U.K.);
BBC Worldwide Ltd., [1998] F.S.R. 665 (High Ct., Ch.D.) (U.K.) (failure to label stickers as
"not authorized" was not implicit misrepresentation that they were authorized).
130. Irvine v. Talksport, Ltd., [2002] F.S.R. 60 (High Ct., Ch.D.), affd, [2003]
E.W.C.A. (Civ) 423 (U.K.); see M. Learmouth, Eddie, Are You OK? Product Endorsement
and Passing Off [2002] I.P.Q. 306.
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while the traditional English approach to passing off allowed a football
club's insignia to be used on clothing as a "badge of allegiance" when there
was no likelihood of confusion as to source, under the expanded approach to
passing off this conclusion was no longer tenable. 3 ' As these cases illus-
trate, the line between false endorsement and "mere" commercial appropria-
tion is difficult to discern. As recently as 1999, however, English courts
continued to reject the claim of a merchandising right in a celebrity's im-
age. 132
In general, the United Kingdom courts have been reluctant to expand
the passing off doctrine to create a merchandising right in fictional charac-
ters.13 1 While the use of a celebrity's name or likeness might in some cases
imply endorsement of a product, it is more difficult to make that argument
with respect to the names or images of fictional characters, since their fic-
tional existence makes it impossible that such a character would literally
"endorse" a product.'34 For many years, English courts rejected character
merchandising claims on the ground that the plaintiff and the defendant
were not engaged in a "common field of activity."'35 More recently, English
courts have relied less on the "common field of activity" restriction, but
have still declined to find misrepresentation unless the defendant affirma-
tively represents that the use of the character is authorized-for example, by
claiming that the merchandise is "official."' 36 Even this may be changing,
however. In the 1991 case of Mirage Studios v. Counter-Feat Clothing Co.,
Ltd., an English court found that the unlicensed use of the Teenage Mutant
Ninja Turtles on clothing constituted passing off; the court reasoned that a
substantial portion of the public is aware that reproducing characters on
131. Arsenal Football Club Plc v. Reed, [2003] EWCA Civ. 696, reversing [2001]
R.P.C. 46 (High Ct., Ch. Div.) (U.K.); see also BBC Worldwide v. Pally Screen Printing,
[1998] F.S.R. 665, 674 (High Ct., Ch.D.) (U.K.) (finding it possible that buyers of T-shirts
with Teletubbies images would not perceive this as an indication of source or endorsement).
132. Elvis Presley Trade Marks, [1999] R.P.C. 567, [597-98] (U.K.). A court in Hong
Kong followed a similar rule in Lau Tak Andy v. Hang Seng Bank Lid., [2000] 1 H.K.C. 280
(C.F.I.), which refused to enjoin the use of a celebrity's image on credit cards because this
did not represent to the public that the celebrity endorsed or licensed the cards.
133. Among the many cases refusing to find passing off are: McCulloch v. Lewis A
May (Produce Distributors) Ltd. [1947] 65 R.P.C. 58 (Ch.D.) (U.K.) (radio character); Conan
Doyle v. London Mystery Magazine Ltd., [1949] 66 R.P.C. 312 (High Ct. J., Ch. Div.)
(U.K.) (Sherlock Holmes); Wombles Ltd. v. Womble Skips Ltd. [1977] R.P.C. 99 (High Ct.
J., Ch. Div.) (U.K.) (Wombles of Wimbledon); Lygnstad v. Anabas Products Ltd., [1977]
F.S.R. 62 (High Ct. Ch.D.) (U.K.) (ABBA group); BBC Worldwide, [1998] F.S.R. 665
(High Ct. Ch. D.) (U.K.) (Teletubbies).
134. See Character Merchandising, supra note 7, at 291.
135. See id. at 294-95 (collecting cases).
136. Elvis Presley Trade Marks, [1997] R.P.C. 543 (High Ct. J.,Ch. Div.), 558-60
(Laddie, J.) (U.K.); Arsenal Football Club Plc v. Reed, [2001] R.P.C. 46, 936 (Laddie, J.) (no
passing off because defendant made clear that his goods were not official Arsenal merchan-
dise); see MACQUEEN, WAELDE, LAURIE & BROWN, supra note 78, at 779.
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goods generally involves a license, thus making it likely that the public
would believe the defendant's goods to be licensed, even though the owner
of the characters did not at that time license them in the United Kingdom.'37
Commentators have noted that it is difficult to distinguish between use of a
character as a source indicator and use of the character as mere product dec-
oration.3 This is almost the same distinction as the elusive one, noted earli-
er, between false endorsement and mere appropriation of a celebrity's like-
ness. 1
39
Under the more liberal approach to passing off embraced in the United
States, unauthorized merchandising activity is typically actionable under a
false endorsement theory even if consumers would be unlikely to believe
that the trademark owner (or celebrity) is the actual source of the defend-
ant's goods. 4° One of the broadest endorsements of this application of pass-
ing off came from the Fifth Circuit, in a case that upheld a university's right
to prevent the use of its distinctive colors and insignia on unauthorized mer-
chandise. 4' While acknowledging that consumers might not care whether
the merchandise they purchased was officially licensed by the university,
the court held that they would in fact believe that this merchandise was li-
censed.'42 The court's reference to "free riding" suggests that its broad no-
tion of passing off is strongly influenced by unfair competition concepts:
[Defendant's] use of the Universities' colors and indicia is designed to create the
illusion of affiliation with the Universities and essentially obtain a "free ride" by
profiting from confusion among the fans of the Universities' football teams who
desire to show support for and affiliation with those teams. This creation of a link
in the consumer's mind between the t-shirts and the Universities and the intent to
directly profit therefrom results in "an unmistakable aura of deception" and likeli-
hood of confusion. 1
43
137. Mirage Studios v. Counter-Feat Clothing Co. Ltd., [1991] F.S.R. 145 (Ch.D.)
(U.K.).
138. Character Merchandising, supra note 7, at 293.
139. It has been predicted that the UK will have to broaden its protection for mer-
chandising rights in order to comply with § 5(2) of the EU Trademark Directive, which pro-
vides that member states may forbid the use of registered marks, even on dissimilar goods,
when (1) the mark has a reputation, and (2) the use of the mark "takes unfair advantage of, or
is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark." Character Mer-
chandising, supra note 7, at 292. It should be noted, however, that this language is permis-
sive rather than mandatory, and it applies only to registered marks.
140. See, e.g., Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1024-25 (3d Cir. 2008);
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1992); Dallas Cowboys Cheer-
leaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1979).
141. Louisiana State Univ. v. Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2008).
142. Id. at 485.
143. Id. at 483-84. This language echoes a passage from the same court's prior deci-
sion in Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004
(5th Cir. 1975), which held that the sale of patches bearing another's trademark could in-
fringe even if the patches were not already attached to other merchandise. The court held that
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However, there is some conflict even among the federal courts. While
many courts are willing to infer some likelihood of confusion in these cas-
es, 144 others have held that no infringement exists when the consumer is
likely to perceive the mark simply as ornamentation or as a badge of alle-
giance. Some courts have reached this result by applying an exception for
the "functional" use of a mark, 141 or by finding that there is no likelihood of
confusion as to source or sponsorship."4
Australia has yet to choose between the stricter and more liberal inter-
pretations of passing off. There is conflicting case law on unauthorized
merchandising, with some courts adopting an approach close to that of the
civil law countries, under which the owner of the mark can recover if con-
sumers make some sort of association between the defendant's goods and
the owner of the mark, even if they do not believe there is a commercial
arrangement. 14
7
However, the Australian courts have not reached a consensus on the
nature of the association that consumers must perceive. In the 1960 case of
Henderson v. Radio Corp. Pty. Ltd.,148 the New South Wales Supreme Court
the patches themselves were the infringing goods, and that it was "irrelevant" whether or not
the consumers were confused about the source of the patches: "The argument that confusion
must be as to the source of the manufacture of the emblem itself is unpersuasive, where the
trademark, originated by the team, is the triggering mechanism for the sale of the emblem."
Id. at 1012; accord Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22 (1 st Cir. 1989).
144. Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 484-85; Boston Athletic Ass'n, 867 F.2d 22; Univ.
of Ga. Athletic Ass'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg.,
510 F.2d at 1004.
145. See, e.g., Int'l Org. of Job's Daughters v. Lindenburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 917-
19 (9th Cir. 1980); Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 720-21
(C.D. Pa. 1983). The Ninth Circuit initially applied the Job's Daughters analysis to reject a
merchandising claim involving the "Betty Boop" character in Fleischer Studios, Inc. v.
A. V.E.L.A., Inc., 636 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2011), but it later withdrew this part of the opinion
without explanation. Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir.
2011). The withdrawn opinion in Fleischer Studios also cautioned that extending trademark
protection to the merchandising of public domain character images would allow an end-run
around the limited term of copyright protection. Fleischer Studios, 636 F.3d at 1124.
146. Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 173
(M.D.N.C. 1989); Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. at 719-20. Scholarly commentary on
merchandising rights is also divided. See, e.g., Irene Calboli, The Case for a Limited Protec-
tion of Trademark Merchandising, 11 U. ILL. L. REV. 865 (2011); Dogan & Lemley, supra
note 114; Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandis-
ing of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603 (1984).
147. See Hogan v. Koala Dundee (1988) 83 ALR 187 (Fed. Ct. Austl., QId. Dist.)
(finding false endorsement where store's trade dress imitated items closely associated with
Paul Hogan's character in "Crocodile Dundee" film); Pacific Dunlop Ltd. v. Hogan (1987)
87 ALR 14 (Austl.) (ad which imitated scene from Crocodile Dundee constituted misrepre-
sentation of commercial origin); Henderson v. Radio Corp. Pty. Ltd. [1960] SR (NSW) 576
(Austl.) (finding false endorsement where dancers' likenesses appeared on record sleeve).
148. [1960] SR (NSW) 576 (Austl.) (rejecting "common field of activity" require-
ment).
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held that the unauthorized use of two dancers' images on a record sleeve
constituted passing off because consumers would believe that the dancers
endorsed or approved the recording.'49 However, the court also advanced a
second ground for its decision-that the dancers' reputation had been
wrongfully appropriated. 5 ' This "wrongful appropriation rationale" is com-
parable to the right of publicity recognized in the United States and also
suggests a "free riding" or "unjust enrichment" rationale characteristic of
unfair competition regimes. Later case law, however, utilized the narrower
false endorsement rationale, finding that unauthorized merchandising of
character images or distinctive elements of a motion picture may lead con-
sumers to believe there is a licensing arrangement. 5' In a 1988 decision
involving merchandising rights in the film Crocodile Dundee, the Federal
Court of Australia criticized the false endorsement rationale as "artificial"
and as overly dependent on the public's perceptions (or misperceptions) as
to the state of the law on merchandising.'52 Instead, the court invoked the
broader misappropriation rationale:
The essence of the wrong done in the [character and celebrity merchandising] cases
... is not in truth a misrepresentation that there is a licensing or sponsoring agree-
ment between the applicant and the respondent; it is in the second ground taken in
the Henderson case, namely wrongful appropriation of a reputation or, more wide-
ly, wrongful association of goods with an image properly belonging to the appli-
cant. 1
53
Emphasizing that "association" could refer to "a connection other than
one relating to 'quality or endorsement,"" 54 the court enjoined the respond-
ent's use of any names or images "calculated to induce the public to believe
that the first respondent or goods sold by it is associated with the film
'Crocodile Dundee' or the character portrayed by the applicant Paul Hogan
in the film."' 55 Only one year later, the same court was deeply divided on a
decision to uphold a passing off claim arising from a television ad that imi-
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Children's Television Workshop Inc. v. Woolworths Ltd., [1981] 1
NSWLR 273 (Austl.) (unauthorized use of "Sesame Street" characters on toys likely to mis-
lead consumers into believing there is a licensing arrangement); see also Moorgate Tobacco
Co. Ltd. v. Philip Morris Ltd., (1984) 156 CLR 414 (Austl.) (rejection of general tort of
unfair competition has not prevented adaptation of passing off tort to unauthorized use of
indicia suggesting "association, quality or endorsement" of goods).
152. Hogan v. Koala Dundee Pty Ltd., (1988) 83 ALR 187 (Fed. Ct. Austl.). Christo-
pher Wadlow has described the state of Australian merchandising law as follows: "Misrepre-
sentation must still be shown, and the misrepresentation can be found in the public supposing
there to be some sort of commercial arrangement of an unspecified kind between the plaintiff
and the defendant." CHRISTOPHER WADLOW, THE LAW OF PASSING OFF 298-99 (2d ed. 1995).
153. Hogan, 83 ALR 187.
154. Id. (citing Moorgate Tobacco, 156 CLR 414).
155. Id.
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tated the famous knife scene from Crocodile Dundee."6 Judge Sheppard,
dissenting, found the passing off claim untenable because viewers "could
not reasonably conclude that Mr. Hogan had consented to or authorized the
advertisement."'' 57 The other two judges upheld the trial court's finding of
passing off, but applied different rationales. Judge Beaumont believed that
the lower court was reasonable to conclude that a significant number of
viewers would believe "that a commercial arrangement had been concluded
between the first respondent and the appellant under which the first re-
spondent agreed to the advertising."' 5 In contrast, Judge Burchett adopted a
broader rationale, closer to unfair competition. He noted that "the question
becomes whether the vagueness of the message prevents the application of
the principles of passing off."'59 In his view, passing off could be found re-
gardless of whether viewers believed that the parties had a commercial li-
censing arrangement:
In my opinion, the vagueness of the suggestion conveyed in this case is not suffi-
cient to save it. That vagueness is not incompatible with great effectiveness. It
would be unfortunate if the law merely prevented a trader using the primitive club
of direct misrepresentation, while leaving him free to employ the more sophisticat-
ed rapier of suggestion, which may deceive more completely. In my opinion, the
deployment in circumstances of the present kind of techniques of persuasion, de-
signed to influence prospective customers in favour of a trader or his products up-
on the basis of some underlying assumption which is false, may be held to be mis-
leading or deceptive or to be likely to mislead or deceive within the meaning of s
52, and may also be held to constitute passing off.
60
These cases suggest that Australia may be edging toward a more liber-
al application of the passing off theory to protect merchandising rights,
comparable to that which has developed in the United States, thus blurring
the traditional boundaries between deception-based protection and the anti-
free-riding concept embraced by unfair competition regimes.
C. The Latest Battleground: Keyword Advertising
The disharmony between the passing off and unfair competition re-
gimes in Europe is being highlighted once again in the context of keyword
advertising. The lower courts in France have (with one exception) held ad-
vertisers and Google liable for the unauthorized use of trademarks as key-
words ("adwords").'6 ' In one such case, the Court of Strasburg found no
156. Hogan v. Pacific Dunlop Ltd. (1989) 87 A.L.R. 14 (Fed. Ct. Austl.).
157. Id. (Sheppard, J., dissenting).
158. Id. (Beaumont, J.)
159. Id. (Burchett, J.)
160. Id.
161. See AdWords Lawsuits in France - Trademarks as Keywords Illegal?, LINKS &
LAW, http://www.linksandlaw.com/adwords-google-keyword-lawsuit-France.htm (collecting
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trademark infringement, but held that the use of adwords constituted unfair
competition under Section 1382 of the French Civil Code.
62
In contrast, in a declaratory judgment action the BGH in Germany re-
jected both trademark and unfair competition claims arising from an adver-
tiser's use of a competitor's company name as an adword. 163 The trademark
claim failed because the court found no likelihood of confusion as to
source."6 The unfair competition claim was based on two assertions: (1) that
the advertiser was taking unfair advantage of the reputation of the mark, and
(2) that the advertiser's use of the mark would enable it to attract the trade-
mark owner's customers. 65 The BGH rejected both of these assertions, find-
ing that (1) it was improbable that an internet user would transfer the per-
ceived qualities associated with the adword to the defendant advertiser's
offer, 66 and (2) the trademark owner had no protectable right to retain its
customer base.' 67 Although another case involving adwords was referred to
the ECJ, that case involved only trademark infringement, not unfair compe-
tition. 61
In March of 2010, the ECJ issued three opinions holding that the use
of adwords by advertisers is trademark use and thus potentially infringe-
ment if the use is likely to cause confusion, but that the use of adwords by
Google is not.'69 However, the questions referred to the ECJ in these cases
cases); GOOGLE'S AD WORDS LAWSUITS WORLDWIDE, http://www.linksandlaw.com/adwords-
pendinglawsuits.htm.
162. TGI Strasbourg Ire chambre civile Jugement du 20 juillet 2007, Atrya / Google
France et autres. This case is unpublished; however a report is available at www.legalis.net.
163. Bundesgerichtschof [BGH] Jan. 22, 2009, Case 1 ZR 30/07 (Ger.) (the "Beta
Layout" case), available at http://www.telemedicus.info/urteile/Marken-und-Namensrecht/
Keywordwerbung/725-BGH-Az-I-ZR-3007-Beta-Layout.html.
164. Id. at 16.
165. These claims were spelled out in the opinion from the court of second instance:
Oberlandesgericht Dusseldorf [OLG] Jan. 23, 2007, Case 1-20 U 79/06 (Ger.) (the "Beta
Layout" case), available at http://www.telemedicus.info/urteile/Marken-und-Namensrecht/
Keywordwerbung/54-OLG-Duesseldorf-Az-I-20-U-7906-Keine-Markenrechts verletzung-
durch-Keywordwerbung .html.
166. Beta Layout, Case 1 ZR 30/07, at 22.
167. Id. at 23.
168. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] Jan. 22, 2009, Case I ZR 125/07 (Ger.) (Eis.de
GmbH v. BBY Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH) (the "Bananabay" case).
169. Case C-236/08, Google Fr. SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010 ECJ
EUR-Lex LEXIS 119 (Mar. 23, 2010), http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=CELEX:62008J0236:EN:HTML (joined cases C-236/08 to C-238/08) (referred by
the French Court of Cassation); Case C-278/08, Die BergSpechte Outdoor Reisen und
Alpinschule Edi Koblmliller GmbH v. Glinter Guni, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 124 (Mar.
23, 2010), http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62008J0278:
EN:HTML (referred by Austria's Oberster Gerichtshof); Case C-91/09, Eis.de GmbH v.
BBY Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 490 (Mar. 26, 2010),
http://eur-lex.europa.eu[LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:6200900091 :FR:HTM
(referred by German BGH). For a detailed discussion of these rulings, see Tyson Smith,
Vol. 2011:14131436
HeinOnline  -- 2011 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1436 2011
Passing Off and Unfair Competition
(referred by France, Austria, and Germany) did not address the question of
unfair competition. In a fourth case referred to the ECJ, the Hoge Raad of
the Netherlands asked for a preliminary ruling on the question of whether
states may prohibit keyword advertising that "takes unfair advantage of, or
is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark."'70
However, the ECJ's ruling in this case, issued in July of 2010, found it un-
necessary to reach this question in light of its disposition on the other ques-
tions presented.
The question whether the unauthorized use of trademarks in keyword
advertising constitutes unfair competition arose again in Interflora, Inc. v.
Marks & Spencer, an English case that was referred to the ECJ in 2009.'
Since May 2008, Google had adopted a more aggressive policy on keyword
advertising in the United Kingdom and Ireland than in continental Europe,
apparently based on the difference between the approaches to trademark
protection in the common law and civil law regimes.' The Advocate Gen-
eral of the EU issued a preliminary opinion in 2011, stating that, in the
adwords context, if the sponsored link mentions the trademark, then the
question of free riding "depends on whether we are faced with legitimate
comparative advertising, or on the contrary, with riding on the coat-tails of
the trade mark proprietor."'' 3 Accordingly, the trademark owner is entitled
to prevent the use of its mark in sponsored links when (1) the mark is used
as a generic term for the goods or services, or (2) the advertiser attempts "to
benefit from [the mark's] power of attraction, its reputation or its prestige,
and to exploit the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of that
mark."'
74
In September of 2011, the ECJ issued its opinion in Interflora.75 For
the first time, the court considered not only the trademark claims arising
from keyword advertising, but also the unfair competition claims. In ad-
dressing the trademark claims, the court emphasized that Marks & Spen-
cer's use of Interflora's mark presented a case of "double identity" because
Marks & Spencer was using an identical mark in connection with identical
Googling a Trademark: A Comparative Look at Keyword Use in Internet Advertising, 46
TEXAS INT. L.J. 232, 238-42 (2010).
170. Portakabin Ltd. v. Primakabin, July 8, 2010, http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-
bin/gettext.pl? lang-en&num=79899291C I 9080558&doc=T&ouvert=T&seance=ARRET.
171. Interflora, Inc. v. Marks & Spencer Plc, [2009] EWHC 1095 (High Ct., Ch.D.)
(U.K.).
172. See id., [20]-[22]; Kate Tebbutt, Recent Changes to the Google Adwords Trade
Mark Policy in the UK and Ireland, 2 BLOOMBERG EUR. Bus. L. REv. 398, 400 (2008).
173. Opinion of Advocate General Jdaskinen, Case C-323/09, 103 (Mar. 24, 2011).
174. Id. at 107(2).
175. Interflora, Inc. v. Marks & Spencer Plc, [2011] Case C-323/09, 2011 WL
4388782 (U.K.).
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goods or services.'76 Under these circumstances, Interflora's mark was enti-
tled to "absolute protection,"' 77 meaning that Marks & Spencer would be
liable if its use of Interflora's mark was likely to have
an adverse effect on one of the functions of the trade mark, irrespective of whether
the function concerned is the essential function of indicating the origin of the prod-
uct or service covered by the trade mark or one of the other functions of the mark,
such as that of guaranteeing the quality of that product or service or that of com-
munication, investment or advertising. 1
78
In contrast, if Marks & Spencer were not offering identical goods or ser-
vices, then it would be liable only if its use of the Interflora mark gave rise
to a likelihood of confusion as to origin 179-the same rule that would apply
in a passing off regime.
Because the two parties in this case offered identical services, Marks
& Spencer's keyword advertising was actionable if it affected the commu-
nication, investment, or advertising functions of the Interflora mark, even if
consumers were not likely to be confused about the origin of Marks &
Spencer's services. The ECJ concluded that, in this case, keyword advertis-
ing did not impair the advertising function of the mark, 8 ' but left it to the
English courts to determine whether the defendant's activity impaired the
investment function of the mark-that is, whether it jeopardized Interflora's
ability to maintain a reputation capable of attracting consumers and retain-
ing their loyalty. 8' The ECJ also left it to the English courts to determine
whether Marks & Spencer's use of the Interflora mark undermined the dis-
tinctiveness of that mark to such a degree that consumers might come to
perceive the mark as a generic term for flower delivery services.'82
In contrast to previous keyword advertising cases, the ECJ in
Interflora also considered whether the unauthorized use of Interflora's mark
constituted unfair competition-specifically, whether such a use "without
due cause ... takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character of the re-
pute of the trade mark," thus constituting unlawful "free riding."'83 The
court had no difficulty concluding that keyword advertising is designed to
capitalize on the distinctive character and repute of a mark, and that the
advertiser derives an advantage from its unauthorized use of the mark to
attract the attention of consumers who may then decide to purchase the ad-
176. Id. 33.
177. Id. 36.
178. Id. 38.
179. Id. 36.
180. Id. 57, 59.
181. Id. 62, 65.
182. Id. 76-83. The court referred to this process as "dilution." Id. 76-77.
183. Id. 92. This standard is drawn from the unfair competition provision of the
2008 Trademark Directive, Council Directive 2008/95/EC, Article 5(2), which carries over
from Article 5(2) of its predecessor, Council Directive 89/104/EC.
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vertiser's goods or services."8 The remaining question was whether this
advantage was unfair. Here, the court drew directly from its analysis in the
L'Oreal case, holding that the use of another party's mark in keyword ad-
vertising can, in the absence of "due cause,"
be construed as a use whereby the advertiser rides on the coat-tails of a trade mark
with a reputation in order to benefit from its power of attraction, its reputation and
its prestige, and to exploit, without paying any financial compensation and without
being required to make efforts of its own in that regard, the marketing effort ex-
pended by the proprietor of that mark in order to create and maintain the image of
that mark. If that is the case, the advantage thus obtained by the third party must be
considered to be unfair.'
85
Although the ECJ left it to the English courts to apply this standard to
the facts, the court observed that unfairness was "particularly likely to be
the conclusion" where the keyword advertiser is offering goods which are
"imitations" of the goods or services offered by the trademark owner. 86 In
contrast, if the advertiser merely offers an "alternative" to the trademark
owner's goods or services, then the keyword advertising should be consid-
ered fair, because offering consumers an alternative constitutes "due cause"
for referencing a competitor's trademark:
By contrast, where the advertisement displayed on the internet on the basis of a
keyword corresponding to a trade mark with a reputation puts forward - without of-
fering a mere imitation of the goods or services of the proprietor of that trade mark,
without causing dilution or tarnishment and without, moreover, adversely affecting
the functions of the trade mark concerned - an alternative to the goods or services
of the proprietor of the trade mark with a reputation, it must be concluded that such
use falls, as a rule, within the ambit of fair competition in the sector for the goods
or services concerned and is thus not without "due cause."'
87
Thus, for purposes of unfair competition, Interflora tells us that it is
crucial to determine whether the advertiser's goods or services are "imita-
tions" or "alternatives." But what is the difference? Unfortunately, the ECJ
did not address this question. In a context such as flower delivery services,
it is difficult to see what would distinguish an "imitation" service from an
"alternative" service. The Advocate General's opinion suggested that Marks
& Spencer's service was an alternative, and not an imitation, but offered no
explanation for this conclusion.'88 The ECJ opinion leaves the ultimate ap-
plication of this principle to the domestic courts. In light of their hostility to
L 'Orealit seems likely that the English courts will perceive Interflora as a
thorny bouquet. Whether or not the imitation/alternative distinction proves
184. Id. 86-87.
185. Id. 89 (citing L'Oreal SA v. Bellure NV, C-487/07, 49, 79 (June 18, 2009)).
186. Id. 90.
187. Id. 91 (citing Article 5(2) of Directive 89/104/EC); see also id. 95.
188. Opinion of Advocate General Jaifskinen, Case 323/09, 104-05 (Mar. 24,
2011).
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viable will have a significant impact on the outcome of future adwords cas-
es throughout the EU." 9
In the United States, the application of passing off doctrine to keyword
advertising remains unsettled. The federal courts have yet to reach a con-
sensus on whether keyword advertising constitutes "trademark use" at all. 9°
The answer may depend on whether the trademark is used simply to trigger
the ad, or whether it is actually displayed in the resulting ad.'9' Even if
trademark use is found, the question whether that use is likely to cause con-
fusion turns on a fact-intensive multi-factor analysis.' It is safe to say,
however, that, in determining whether keyword advertising is infringement,
American courts will not concern themselves with the question whether the
competitor's goods are "imitations" or "alternatives."
CONCLUSION
The common law regime that has come under the greatest pressure to
abandon the deception-based concept of passing off in favor of a broader
unfair competition law is the United Kingdom. However, courts in that ju-
risdiction have expressed deep reservations about whole-heartedly embrac-
ing the broad notion of unfair competition law that prevails in the civil law
regimes of continental Europe, in particular because the quest for "fairness"
threatens to undermine the goals of "competition." It remains to be seen
whether their concerns will influence the rest of the EU.
Free from these pressures to conform to EU policy, the United States
continues to favor free competition over highly regulated markets and ab-
stract notions of fairness and "free riding," and is therefore likely to contin-
ue to favor the passing off regime. Even in the United States, however, ag-
gressive litigation by trademark owners has led to considerable expansion of
the passing off doctrine, with respect to both registered and unregistered
marks, and today the concept of "false endorsement" has been interpreted so
189. For a British perspective, see Darren Meale, Interfiora: The Last Word on Key-
word Advertising?, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 11 (2012).
190. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152-53 & n. 4 (4th Cir.
2012) (assuming, without deciding, that keyword advertising is trademark use). The trend,
however, is toward recognizing this as a trademark use. See Network Automation, Inc. v.
Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2011); Rescuecom Corp. v.
Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2009).
191. See Hamzik v. Zale Corp./Del., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28981, at *2 (N.D.N.Y.
Apr. 19, 2007) (suggesting that display of mark may be trademark use even if sponsored
linking is not); see also Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 501 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (implying agreement with Hamzik).
192. See Rosetta Stone, 676 F.3d at 153-60 (finding triable issues of fact under like-
lihood of confusion factors); Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1149-54 (finding district
court's multi-factor analysis inadequate).
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broadly as to approximate misappropriation. Australia seems to be follow-
ing a similar path.
In some common law countries, legislative actions have also eroded
the traditional requirement of deception or confusion in trademark law. In
this regard, the most significant legislative development is the recognition
of trademark dilution, which dispenses with the requirement of confusion in
certain circumstances. In the United States, the dilution provisions in Sec-
tion 43(c) of the Lanham Act protect only "famous" marks against two
types of non-confusion-related harms-blurring and tamishment.'93 In Can-
ada, the dilution statute prohibits any use of a registered mark that will "de-
preciate[] the value of the goodwill attaching thereto."'9 4 Dilution statutes
afford trademark owners a significant degree of control over non-confusing
uses of their marks; even though they apply only to a subset of marks, these
laws clearly have the effect of introducing broader unfair competition con-
cepts into common law regimes. In the United States and Canada, however,
dilution claims generally require some evidence of harm (or potential harm)
to the goodwill or reputation of the mark; thus, pure "free riding" is typical-
ly not sufficient-at least, not yet.'95
In the common law regimes, passing off has increasingly become dis-
connected from its moorings in the law of deceit. Countries that place a high
value on vigorous competition have resisted this trend with varying degrees
of success. In the context of copycat products and comparative advertising,
their resistance has been especially strong; the United Kingdom, however,
cannot maintain its position unless it persuades the rest of the EU to tolerate
a less-regulated competitive environment. While the seemingly unstoppable
growth of the merchandising right in the United States contrasts sharply
with the United Kingdom's continued refusal to recognize such a right,
cracks in the latter's resistance have emerged, even without pressure from
the EU, as the line between false endorsement and free riding has become
193. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
194. See Trademarks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13, § 22. In Canada, unlike the United
States, dilution protection is limited to registered trademarks. In addition, the Canadian Su-
preme Court has interpreted § 22 narrowly. See Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin & Maison Fondee
en 1772 v. Boutiques Cliquot Ltee, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 824 (Can.).
195. See Robert G. Howell, Depreciation of Goodwill: A "Green Light"for Dilution
from the Supreme Court of Canada in an Accommodating Infrastructure, 17 TRANSNAT'L
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 689, 706-10 (2008); Darren Meale & Joel Smith, Enforcing a
Trade Mark When Nobody's Confused: Where the Law Stands After L'Oreal and Intel, 5 J.
INTELL. L. & PRAc. 101-02 (2010); Mary LaFrance & Gail H. Cline, Identical Cousins? On
the Road with Dilution and the Right of Publicity, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGHii TECH
L.J. 641, 669-71 (2007-08) (discussing Canada's dilution statute). For a debate on the role of
free-riding in American dilution law, compare David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doc-
trine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American Trademark
Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117 (2004), with Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property,
and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005).
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less distinct. This blurring has also become evident in Australia. Although
the different approaches to trademark protection continue to reflect the
strong cultural difference between legal regimes that prioritize the protec-
tion of brand owners' investments and those that prioritize consumer protec-
tion, the pressures toward doctrinal convergence will intensify as trademark
owners seek to aggressively expand their brand identities without regard to
national borders.
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